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I. INTRODUCTION

Most lawyers in Florida are probably familiar with the State's Offer
of Judgment Statute because, according to the Florida Legislature, the
Statute applies to "any civil action for damages" filed within the State.'
* Associate, Hopping Green & Sams, P.A.; B.S., B.A., J.D., University of Florida. I
thank Justice Rivlin for encouraging me to write and Judge Miller for teaching me to write.
** Circuit Court Judge, Florida Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
1. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (2009). The statute provides in relevant part that:
(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a
defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the
plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover
reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the
defendant's behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other
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Briefly, for the unfamiliar, the Statute entitles a party that offers a
settlement in a civil case to reasonable costs and attorney's fees if the
offer is rejected and the eventual judgment in the case is at least twentyfive percent less favorable than the offer.2 The Statute, by creating a
disincentive for parties to reject good faith offers of settlement, hopes
"to encourage parties to settle claims without going to trial." 3
However, because of the peculiar nature of maritime law, it is
unclear whether the Statute-and spVecifically its attorney's fees
provision-applies in maritime cases. In fact, the simple question
posed by the title of this Essay has elicited two very different answers
from state and federal courts in Florida. The federal courts say that the
Offer of Judgment Statute does not apply in maritime cases because it
substantively conflicts with the general federal rule prohibiting
attorney's fees. 5 The state courts disagree. 6 This disagreement among
the state and federal courts is disconcerting because it may encourage
federal-state forum shopping in one of the country's leading maritime
jurisdictions.7 Avoiding the disagreement is seldom an option because
contract firom the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no
liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent
less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney's
fees against the award. Where such costs and attorney's fees total more
than the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant
against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees, less the
amount of the plaintiff's award. If a plaintiff files a demand for
judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and
the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent
greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable
costs and attorney's fees incurred from the date of the filing of the
demand. If rejected, neither an offer nor demand is admissible in
subsequent litigation, except for pursuing the penalties of this section.
Id. The phrase "courts of this state" includes both state and federal courts. See Menchise v.
Akerman Senterfitt, 532 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 2008).
2. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (2009).
3. Aspen v. Bayless, 564 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. 1990).
4. The Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, for example, has yet to settle on a consistent
answer to whether the Offer of Judgment Statute applies in maritime cases. Compare Sanchez v.
Carnival Corp., Case No.: 98-4260 CA32 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 2, 2007) http://www.miamidadeclerk.com/civil (holding that the Offer of Judgment Statute did not apply), with Escalona v.
Carnival Corp., Case No.: 01-29813 CA15 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 2003) (holding that the Offer
of Judgment statute did apply).
5. Garan Inc. v. MIV Avik, 907 F. Supp. 397, 399-01 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
6. Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
7. Florida is a leading maritime jurisdiction because of the sheer volume of maritime
commerce passing through its fourteen deep water ports. See generally FLORIDA PORTS
COUNCIL, STATISTICS http://www.flaports.org/. This high amount of maritime trade naturally
creates a greater demand for attorneys practicing maritime law. A Westlaw Profiler search for
the profiles of "Attorneys and Judges" for attorneys practicing maritime law suggest that Florida
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of the Statute's expansive
scope, i.e., its applicability to "any civil
8
action for damages."
The purpose of this Essay is to answer the deceptively simple
question posed by the title by making sense of the not so simple
doctrines, and often contradictory rationales, upon which courts have
relied to arrive at their inconsistent answers. The Essay begins with a
brief discussion of the source of maritime law's peculiar nature: the
U.S. Constitution. It goes on to explain the Erie and reverse-Erie
principles that apply whenever answering questions like the one posed
by the title before directly addressing the impasse between state and
federal courts in Florida. The Essay concludes by offering a possible
solution to the impasse.
II. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION & MARITIME LAW
The U.S. Constitution, recognizing the importance of having a
uniform national maritime law, provides that federal judicial power
"shall extend ...to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."' 0

Consistent with the constitutional grant of power, Congress has
conferred on federal district courts original jurisdiction over maritime
cases." I This conference includes jurisdiction over cases arising from
torts on navigable waters 12 and those where interpretation of maritime
contracts is at issue. 13 The federal judiciary's expansive jurisdiction,
might be the country's leading maritime jurisdiction. (Search on Oct. 1, 2009,
http://www.westlaw.com. According to the Westlaw search, Florida has 222 attorneys and
judges who practice maritime law, compared to 101 for California, 114 for New York and 54 for
Washington, D.C.).
8. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST No. 80, 502 (Benjamin Wright ed.,
Belknap Press 1961) (1787). Specifically, Alexander Hamilton writes that:

The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a
disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes.
These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect
the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are
relative to the public peace. The most important part of them are, by the
present Confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction.
Id.
10.
11.
12.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
See, e.g., Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Zareno, 712 So. 2d 791, 793-94 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1998).
13.

Norfolk S. R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23-28 (2004) (holding that federal

maritime jurisdiction extends to contracts that concern a maritime transaction, unless the
transaction is inherently local).
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coupled with the need for uniformity, has empowered the federal
judiciary to develop substantive maritime common law. 14
However, federal judicial power over maritime law is not absolute.
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, while conferring on the newly created
federal district courts "original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," Congress also inserted a provision
"saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it."' 5 According to the U.S.
Supreme Court this "saving to suitors" provision found in the Judiciary
Act, and its successor statutes, confers limited concurrent jurisdiction
over maritime cases to state courts. 1 6 The limited concurrent jurisdiction
allows state courts to preside over certain maritime cases.' 7 It also
allows state law to supplement federal maritime law so long as the state
18
law does not interfere with the uniformity of substantive federal law.
Deciding whether or not state law interferes with the uniformity of
substantive federal maritime law requires the application of the reverseErie test. 19 A state law that passes the test does not interfere with the
uniformity of federal maritime law, and thus, is a permissible
supplement to federal law. 20 By contrast, a state law that fails the
reverse-Erie test interferes with the uniformity
of substantive federal
21
law, and so is not a permissible supplement.
14. See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986); Romero
v. Int'l Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959), superseded by rule, U.S. Express Lines Ltd.
v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2002).
15. Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (emphasis added). The
current statute conferring original jurisdiction to federal district courts is similar to the Judiciary
Act of 1789. According to the current statute, "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (2009).
16. Madruga v. Super. Ct. of Cal. in & for San Diego County, 346 U.S. 556, 560-61
(1954).
17. State courts usually preside over cases brought under the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (2009). The Act, commonly referred to as the Jones Act, allows a
seaman to sue the owner or operator of a vessel for negligence in state court. Engel v.
Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37 (1926) (stating that "[it is clear that the State courts have
jurisdiction concurrently with the Federal courts, to enforce the right of action established by the
Merchant Marine Act as a part of the maritime law") (citations omitted).
18. See, e.g., Southworth Mach. Co., Inc. v. F/X Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir.
1993); Pacific Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990);
Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Zareno, 712 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
19. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986) (stating that "the
extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called
'reverse-Erie' doctrine, which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States
conform to governing federal maritime standards").
20. Id.
21. Id.
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III. ERiE AND REVERSE-ERIE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The reverse-Erie test, as the name implies, traces its origin to the
Erie doctrine. Therefore, a discussion of Erie's subtleties is warranted
before delving into the reverse-Erie test.
Roughly stated, the Erie doctrine requires federal courts in diversity
cases to apply substantive state law and procedural federal law.
According to Erie, there exists "no federal general common law"
because there exists no general federal law-making power.23 Therefore,
unless a case is "governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state" in
which the federal court sits. 24 In other words, the substantive state law
of torts, contracts and property applies in federal courts because "there
can be no other law" in these areas. 5
The Erie doctrine was developed to prevent litigants, who could
establish the diversity of citizenship needed to sue in federal court, from
exploiting the differences between the substantive laws of the state and
federal courts of a particular jurisdiction. As the U.S. Supreme Court
put it, the doctrine developed as "a reaction to the practice of 'forumshopping' that allowed the "result of a litigation materially to differ
because the suit had been brought in a federal court" instead of a state
court.2 6

Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co. 27 highlights the type of intrastate gamesmanship that the
Erie doctrine intended to prevent. In this case, Brown & Yellow, a cab
company based in Kentucky, entered into a contract with a railroad for
the exclusive right to solicit the railroad's passengers at a Kentucky
station. 28 But, Black & White, a competing cab company, continued to
solicit the railroad's passengers.2 9 Brown & Yellow wished to have its
exclusive dealing contract enforced. 3 0 However, the company knew that
Kentucky state courts did not enforce contracts like the one between it
and the railroad. 3 1 Desperate to enforce the contract, Brown & Yellow
22. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,471 (1965).
23. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
24. Id.
25. Hanna, 380 U.S. 460 at 472.
26. Id.
27. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1928); see generally Paul Ryerson, Inconsistent Inconsistency: A
Comment on Arrested Development of the FederalCommon Law of Foreign Relations, 16 FLA.
J. INT'L L. 789 (2004).
28. Id. at 522-23.
29. Id. at 523.
30. Id. at 522.
31. byId.
532 (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
Published
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reincorporated in Tennessee and then sued in Kentucky federal court by
invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction. 32 Federal common law in the
jurisdiction, unlike Kentucky's common law, did enforce exclusive
dealing contracts. 33 So, by choosing to bring a suit in Kentucky federal
court instead of Kentucky state court, the plaintiff carried the day.34 Had
Erie been in place the Kentucky federal court, while hearing the case
under its diversity jurisdiction, would have applied Kentucky's
substantive common law of contracts. 35 Consequently, the outcome in
both the federal and state forum would have been the same. Stated
differently, had Erie been in place there would not have existed parallel
and conflicting substantive laws in a single state that allowed a plaintiff
to choose the forum that would allow it to prevail.
Because the reverse-Erie test draws its inspiration from the Erie
doctrine, it too is concerned with preventing intrastate forum shopping
made possible by having two parallel and conflicting substantive rules
in one jurisdiction. According to the test, a state court may only apply
state law to a maritime case before it when controlling federal maritime
precedent is absent, 36 or when there is no substantive conflict between
federal maritime law and state law.3 7 This second requirement actually
calls upon a court to first determine whether the state law in question is
substantive or procedural and then to determine
whether the state law
38
precedent.
maritime
federal
with
conflicts
If a state law is deemed to be procedural, then that state law may
supplement federal maritime law regardless of whether or not it
conflicts with federal law. 39 But, if the state law is substantive and
conflicts with federal maritime law, then the state law may not
permissibly supplement federal law because such suplementation
would undermine the uniformity of federal maritime law. To make the
preceding paragraph easier to follow, we include the table below that
summarizes the reverse-Erie test when federal maritime precedent on a
particular issue is present:
32. Id. at 523.
33. Id. at 532 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 531.
35. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,471 (1965).
36. See Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 914-17 (11th Cir. 2004); Greenly v.
Mariner Mgmt. Group, 192 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that a court "may-and shouldresort to state law when no federal rule covers a particular situation").
37. See, e.g., Southworth Mach. Co. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1993);
Pacific Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990); Garan, Inc. v.
MN Aivik, 907 F. Supp. 397, 399-01 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Zareno,
712 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
38. Garan,907 F. Supp. at 399.
39. Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
40. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/1
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF FLORIDA'S OFFER OF JUDGMENT STATUTE &
THE IMPASSE BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

Since there is federal maritime precedent on attorney's fees, the
Offer of Judgment Statute's applicability turns on whether the Statute is
substantive or procedural and, if necessary, whether the Statute conflicts
with federal maritime precedent. This section begins by discussing
whether the Offer of Judgment Statute is substantive or procedural. It
then discusses whether the Statute conflicts with the general federal bar
on attorney's fees in maritime cases.
A. Substantive or Procedural
A law is substantive if it "creates, defines, and regulates the rights,
duties, and powers of parties. ' 41 Consistent with this dictionary
definition, the Florida Supreme Court has declared that "a statutory
requirement for the non-prevailing party to pay attorney['s] fees
constitutes 'a new obligation or duty,' and is therefore substantive in
nature. 42 On another occasion, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed
the substantive nature of statutes authorizing attorney's fees by stating
that "[t]he ability to collect attorney's fees from an opposing party, as
well as the obligation to pay such fees, is substantive in nature." 4 3 Since
the Offer of Judgment Statute creates a statutory requirement to pay
attorney's fees to an opposing party, logic suggests that the Offer of
Judgment Statute, or at least its attorney's fees provision, is substantive
law.
Logic notwithstanding, Florida's intermediate appellate courts have
sought to distinguish the Florida Supreme Court's ostensibly broad and
clear declaration that statutes authorizing attorney's fees are substantive.
For example, the concurring opinion in BDO Seidman, LLP v. British
41. Black's Law Dictionary "substantive law" (8th ed. 2004).
42. Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985).
43. byBitterman
v. Bitterman, Repository,
714 So. 2d 356,
363 (Fla. 1998).
Published
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Car Auctions, Inc.,44 which the principal opinion for the Florida Fourth
District Court of Appeals favorably cited,4 concluded that the Offer of
Judgment Statute, and specifically 46
its attorney's fees provision, is
procedural for choice of law purposes.
The concurring opinion began by declaring that "what is substantive
or procedural for [purposes other than choice of law] [] is not
'4 7
necessarily substantive or procedural for choice of law purposes.
This simple pronouncement allowed the concurring opinion to sidestep
the Florida Supreme Court's seemingly clear declaration that statutes
authorizing attorney's fees are substantive because this declaration was
not made in a choice of law context. The opinion then went on to
conclude that the Statute was procedural because it was "part of the
machinery of Florida's judicial process that promotes judicial
economy."48 Implicit in this conclusion and its judicial economy
rationale was the idea that any state law or court rule that furthers
judicial economy is procedural. Were this true, then all statutes
authorizing attorney's fees would always be procedural.
Attorney's fees provisions exist to deter unnecessary litigation or, in
the case of the Offer of Judgment Statute, to deter the unnecessary
continuation of litigation.49 We as a society wish to deter unnecessary
litigation so that scarce judicial resources may be spent on necessary
litigation. 50 The efficient allocation of scare judicial resources is the
very definition of judicial economy. Thus, if attorney's fees provisions
exist to deter unnecessary litigation and we wish to deter unnecessary
litigation to promote judicial economy, then attorney's fees provisions
always exist to promote judicial economy. And, if promoting judicial
44. BDO Seidman, LLP v. British Car Auctions, Inc., 802 So. 2d 366, 370-74 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2001) (Gross, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 369.
46. Id. at 370. (Gross, J., concurring). The concurring opinion reads as follows:
I write separately to note that even under a choice of law analysis, Seidman
is entitled to recover fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991). This
is so because the offer of judgment statute is "procedural" under Florida
choice of law terminology; it is part of the machinery of Florida's judicial
process that promotes judicial economy.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV.
1161, 1161-62 (1996).
50. See Michael Kinsley, Quayle's Case, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1991, at 4 (arguing that
attorney's fees provisions would "curb lawsuits that are frivolous or extortionate" and "actually
encourage lawsuits that are clearly meritorious," thus allowing a better allocation of scare
judicial resources).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/1
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economy, as the concurring opinion in BDO Seidman reasons, makes an
attorney's fees provision procedural, then all attorney's fees provisions
must be procedural.
However, it is clear that not all attorney's fees provisions are
procedural because the Florida Supreme Court has declared attorney's
fees provisions to be substantive for, as the concurring opinion in BDO
Seidman must admit, at least some purposes. 5' Accordingly, the judicial
economy rationale in BDO Seidman must give way to Florida Supreme
Court's insistence that "a statutory requirement for the non-prevailing
party to pay attomey['s] fees constitutes 'a new obligation or duty,' and
is therefore substantive in nature. 52
In spite of a state court decision's logical flaws when construing
state law, according to Erie's progeny, a state court's decision binds
Therefore, the last word about
both state courts and federal courts.
whether the Offer of Judgment Statute is substantive or procedural is in
the hands of the Florida state courts. 54 Fortunately, however, neither the
principal opinion nor the concurring opinion in BDO Seidman can stop
state or federal courts from declaring that the Offer of Judgment Statute
is substantive for maritime law purposes. Oddly enough, this is made
possible by the very gyrations the BDO Seidman court went through to
declare the Statute procedural for choice of law purposes. Because,
according to the court, what is procedural or substantive for one purpose
cannot be procedural or substantive for all purposes, the court stopped
short of holding the Offer of Judgment Statute to be procedural for
purposes other than the one purpose before it.55 Thus, BDO Seidman's
a choice of law conflict
precedential value is limited to instances where
56
state.
another
and
state
one
between
arises
Once BDO Seidman confined to the choice of law context, it is clear
that for all other contexts, under Florida law, statutes authorizing
attorney's fees are substantive. The Florida Supreme Court has said so
in unequivocal terms. (And as Erie makes clear, the Florida Supreme
Court-as the highest state court-is in the best position to determine
whether statutory provisions authorizing attorney's fees are substantive
51. BDO Seidman, 802 So. 2d at 370 (conceding that attorney's fees provisions are
substantive for Florida constitutional law purposes).
52. Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 1985).
53. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
54. See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards
State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1144
(1999).
55. BDO Seidman, 802 So. 2d at 368-70.
56. In BDO Seidman there was a choice between the laws of Tennessee and Florida. Id.at
367. A choice of law conflict between a validly enacted federal law and state law, however,
would be resolved in favor of the federal law because of the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy
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or procedural under Florida law.) Consequently, one must conclude that
the Offer of Judgment Statute, and specifically its attorney's fees
provision, is substantive law for Erie and reverse-Erie purposes. 57 This
substantive Florida law may, however, still permissibly supplement
federal maritime law so long as it does not conflict with federal law.
B. Conflict Between Offer of Judgment Statute & FederalCommon Law
Neither federal maritime common law nor Florida common law
award attorney's fees absent statutory authorization. 58 The Offer of
Judgment Statute clearly authorizes attorney's fees if an offer of
settlement is rejected and the eventual judgment in the case is at least
twenty-five percent less favorable than the offer.59 No analogous federal
statutory authorization for attorney's fees exists in maritime cases.
If one were simply relying only on the existence of a Florida statute
awarding attorney's fees and federal maritime common law precluding
such fees, one would easily conclude that a conflict exists between the
two. However, any determination about whether a conflict truly exists
becomes more difficult because some federal jurisdictions allow the
prevailing party in a maritime case to recover attorney's fees for a bad
faith breach of 60the uniquely maritime duty to furnish maintenance and
cure to seamen.
In light of the federal bad faith exception, the Florida Third District
Court of Appeal, in Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, held that no
conflict exists between federal maritime common law and the Offer of
Judgment Statute. 61 The Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
as evidence of the absence of conflict. 62 In Vaughan v. Atkinson, the
U.S. Supreme Court allowed a seaman to recover attorney's fees
because the defendant shipowner willfully and persistently breached its
63
duty to provide maintenance and cure to the plaintiff seaman.
According to Modesto, since Vaughn permitted a party to recover
attorney's fees under some circumstances, the Florida Offer of
57.

See, e.g., Menchise v. Akerman Senterfitt, 532 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 2008)

(concluding that the Florida Offer of Judgment Statute is substantive for Erie, and by extension
reverse-Erie, purposes).
58. Noritake Co., Inc. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 1980)

(stating that "[albsent some statutory authorization, the prevailing party in an admiralty case is
generally not entitled to an award for attorneys' fees"); see Young, 472 So. 2d at 1154
(discussing "the American Rule adopted in Florida [that] requires each side to pay its own

attorney's fee unless directed otherwise by a statute or an agreement between the parties").
59. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (2009).
60.
61.

Garan, Inc. v. MN Avik, 907 F. Supp. 397, 399-400 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
See Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

62.

Id.

63. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/1
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Judgment Statute did not conflict with federal law because it too
awarded fees under certain circumstances,
i.e., upon the unreasonable
64
rejection of an offer of settlement.
Unlike Modesto, a federal district court held that a conflict did exist
between federal maritime common law and the Offer of Judgment
Statute.65 In Garan v. M/V Aivik, the federal court, relying on the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida law, began by
reaffirming the substantive nature of the Offer of Judgment Statute's
attorney's fees provision. 66 Garan went on to state that Modesto
"misconstrue[][d] the holding in Vaughan." 67 According to the Garan
court, "Vaughan discusses an exception for a discretionary award of
attorneys' fees in the maritime context but only when the nonprevailing
party has acted in bad faith during the course of the litigation." 68 Since
the Offer of Judgment Statute does not require a finding of bad faith in
the litigation process, 69 and instead merely requires a mathematical
formulation, Garan concluded that the Statute conflicted with, and
was
70
preempted by, the general federal maritime bar on attorney's fees.
The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Sosebee v. Rath7'reached72
a similar conclusion after considering whether a Virgin Island Statute
64. See Modesto, 614 So. 2d at 520.
65. Garan,907 F. Supp. at 399-01.
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 400.
68. Id.
69. It should be noted that the Offer of Judgment Statute allows a trial court to deny
attorney's fees if the court finds that the settlement offer was "not made in good faith." Fla. Stat.
§ 768.79(7)(a) (2009). Specifically, the Statute reads that "[i]f a party is entitled to costs and
fees pursuant to the provisions of this section, the court may disallow an award of costs and
attorney's fees." Id.(emphasis added). Relying on this provision, the defendants in Garan
argued that the Offer of Judgment Statute contained a bad faith provision, and thus the Statute
did not conflict with maritime law. Garan, 907 F. Supp. at 400. The Garan court disagreed.
According to the Garan court, the Offer of Judgment Statute-unlike federal maritime lawdoes not require a trial court to make a bad faith finding before granting fees. 1d.Instead, the
Statute merely allows a court to deny fees if the Statute's mathematical standards are met but the
party seeking fees made its settlement offer in bad faith. Id. The distinction is a fine but crucial
one. According to the federal bad faith exception, a party seeking attorney's fees must seek fees
based on the other party's bad faith. See, e.g., Hines v. J.A. La Porte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1190
(11 th Cir. 1987). By contrast, a party seeking fees under the Offer of Judgment Statute may
collect fees without alleging or proving the other party's bad faith. The other party, i.e., the
party from whom fees are being sought, may defend by arguing that the offeror made its offer in
bad faith. Thus, it is possible for a party to seek attorney's fees under the Offer of Judgment
without the other party's faith, whether good or bad, ever being at issue.
70. Id.at 400-01.
71. Sosebee v. Rath, 893 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir. 1990).
72. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 541 (2009). The statute reads:
(a) Costs
which
may be allowed
in a civil
action include:
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on attorney's fees conflicted with federal maritime law. Specifically, the
Sosebee court held that "a general award of attorney['s] fees pursuant to
a state statute which does not require a finding of bad faith directly
conflicts with federal admiralty law. 73 Holding otherwise, according to
the court, would encourage shopping for jurisdictions that have74 such
statutes, thus undermining the uniformity of federal maritime law.
Modesto, Garan, and Sosebee make clear that there is disagreement
among the Florida state courts and federal courts over how to interpret
Vaughan, and by extension whether or not the Offer of Judgment
Statute conflicts with federal maritime law. But, whose interpretation of
Vaughan should prevail? Recall that according to Erie and its progeny,
federal courts must follow a state court's interpretation of state law
because states are in a better position to interpret their own laws.75 As a
corollary, one would assume that because it is the province of federal
courts to interpret and create federal law, including federal maritime
law, a federal court's interpretation of federal law should bind state
courts. 76 However, although state courts agree that they are bound by
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the state courts vary in how
much deference they give to lower federal court decisions interpreting
(1) Fees of officers, witnesses, and jurors;
(2) Necessary expenses of taking depositions which were reasonably
necessary in the action;
(3) Expenses of publication of the summons or notices, and the postage
when they are served by mail;
(4) Compensation of a master as provided in Rule 53 of the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure;
(5) Necessary expense of copying any public record, book, or document
used as evidence on the trial; and
(6) Attorney's fees as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys shall be left to the
agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but there shall be allowed to
the prevailing party in the judgment such sums as the court in its discretion
may fix by way of indemnity for his attorney's fees in maintaining the
action or defenses thereto; provided, however, the award of attorney's fees
in personal injury cases is prohibited unless the court finds that the
complaint filed or the defense is frivolous.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "frivolous" means:
(i) without legal or factual merit; or
(ii) for the purpose of causing unnecessary delay; or
(iii) for the purpose of harassing an opposing party.
Id.
73. Sosebee, 893 F.2d at 56.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
76. Zeigler, supra note 54, at 1151 n.37 (discussing cases where state courts consider
themselves bound by the decisions of both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts). 12
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/1

2009]

AN EERIE
ERIEAn
QUESTION:
DOES
FLORIDA'S Does
OFFERFlorida's
OFJUDGMENTSTATUTE
APPLY
369
Jazil and
Miller:
Eerie Erie
Question:
Offer of Judgment
Statute

federal law.77 The Florida Supreme Court in particular does not consider
itself, and thus other Florida courts, bound by decisions of the lower
federal courts.7 8 So, state courts in Florida are not bound by Garan or
Sosebee.79 Yet the federal courts, for the sake of consistency, will likely
follow Garan.
Further, because one of Florida's intermediate appellate courts found
no conflict between the Offer of Judgment Statute and the federal
maritime common law of attorney's fees, the Statute applies in maritime
cases filed before state courts. 8However, as noted above, because a
federal court found a conflict between the Offer of Judgment Statute
and federal common law, the Statute does not apply in maritime cases
filed before federal courts. Therefore, there are now two parallel
substantive rules for attorney's fees in Florida, much like there were
two parallel substantive rules for exclusive dealings contracts in Black
& White Taxicab Co.
The availability of two substantive rules for attorney's fees promotes
federal-state forum shopping, just as it did in Black & White Taxicab
Co. Parties to litigation may, for example, decide to bring an action to a
particular forum or remove an action from a particular forum because of
the applicable law on attorney's fees. The party with the weaker hand,
of course, would prefer federal court where the penalties for bluffing
during settlement negotiations do not include attorney's fees. The party
with the stronger hand, by contrast, would prefer state court where the
Offer of Judgment Statute would impose the attorney's fees penalty. So,
both parties would focus their energies on assuring that they are before
the right forum. The right forum for a particular party, just as in Black
& White Taxicab Co., is the forum that provides the best outcome or
greatest payoff from the suit. The fact that the outcomes are different is
disconcerting. Different outcomes, i.e., grossly different recovery
amounts because of the inclusion or exclusion of attorney's fees, in the
same jurisdiction are what Erie was intended to prevent.8 Thus, the
inconsistent decisions about the applicability of the Offer of Judgment
Statute in maritime cases strike at the very essence of the Erie doctrine
and the reverse-Erie test.
77. Id. at 1144-45.
78. Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle, 953 So. 2d 461,465 (Fla. 2007).
79. See id.
80. According to the Florida Supreme Court, "in the absence of interdistrict conflict,
district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts." Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla.
1992) (citing Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985)); see also Stanfill v. State,
384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980). Here the Florida Third District Court of Appeal's decision is
the only relevant decision by a Florida district court. Thus, the decision, and by extension the
Statute, applies in all maritime cases filed before state courts.
81. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

13

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW
Florida Journal of
International Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 1

[Vol. 21

V. CONCLUSION

Considering the state and federal disagreement about whether the
Offer of Judgment Statute conflicts with federal maritime common law,
the answer to the question posed by the title of this Essay is "yes" in
state court, but "no" in federal court. Were the answer "yes" for both
state and federal courts, or in others words, if the Statute applied in
every maritime action filed within the state, one wonders whether this
would promote interstate forum shopping as Sosebee feared.
Presumably, if Florida was the only (or one of the few) jurisdiction to
allow attorney's fees in maritime cases for rejecting an offer settlement,
then parties with a stronger hand would want to see their cases make
their way to Florida, and parties with a weaker hand would want to see
their cases make their way out of Florida. Simply put, Sosebee's fear of
interstate forum shopping would then be realized.
Therefore, if one were searching for the "right" answer to the
question posed by the title of this Essay, we humbly suggest that the
answer would be "no" for both state and federal courts. However, this
right answer requires that Modesto's reading of Vaughan be
recalibrated. This right answer requires that one of Florida's
intermediate appellate courts or the Florida Supreme Court reconsider
Modesto. Until then, the Offer of Judgment Statute and the federal-state
forum shopping and interstate forum shopping it makes possible will
remain a thorn in Erie's side.
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